Settlements in Judea/Samaria (West Bank)
- Jul 15
- 5 min read
Whatever you prefer to call them, “the illegal Israeli settlements” or “the Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria” (or something in between), it is important to know what they are, why they were established and why they stimulate so much heated dialogue.

The gap between world opinion and that of average Israelis on the subject of "settlements" widened significantly after the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023. While international critics have spent decades using the term “illegal Israeli settlements” to condemn the communities in Judea and Samaria, the post-October 7 reality has led an increasing number of Israelis to view these communities not as obstacles to peace, but vital defensive bulwarks. Israelis are acutely aware that it was from a wholly "unoccupied" Gaza Strip that the Hamas attacks emanated from, after the late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon completely denuded the 140 square mile swath of land of Jews and Israeli communities as a part of his 2005 Disengagement Plan. With no Israeli presence in the area to hinder them, Hamas was able to turn flat seaside real estate with no natural strategic advantages into a sophisticated underground tunnel system networking throughout the entire Gaza Strip. Not only did it provide Hamas terrorists supreme tactical maneuverability, it also became an impenetrable holding pen for 250+ Israeli hostages.
The experience with Gaza proved to a sobered Israeli public that territorial withdrawals do not bring peace. Instead, vacuums that can be filled by genocidal terror. As the nation approaches the October 2026 general elections, the domestic debate is no longer about dismantling these communities, but about how their strategic presence secures the geometric heartland of the Jewish state.
To understand the fierce dialogue surrounding this region, one must look at what these communities actually are. The area commonly referred to by international media as the “West Bank” comprises 2,173 square miles of rugged, mountainous terrain captured from Jordan during the defensive 1967 Six-Day War. For Israelis, this territory is known by its millennia-old biblical names: Judea and Samaria. The region forms a high, mountainous spine running north to south between the Mediterranean Sea and the Dead Sea. At its narrowest point, this ridge sits a mere nine miles from Israel’s Mediterranean coast, where 80 percent of the Israeli population resides. The geographic elevation and sheer proximity to Israel's industrial heartland make keeping this high ground out of hostile hands a matter of pure national survival.
Immediately following the Six-Day War, successive Israeli governments on both the political left and right recognized these immutable geographic realities. They established security-related communities along the high peaks overlooking the coastal plain and throughout the Jordan Valley, which provides a formidable natural buffer against eastern threats. Over the decades, these outposts evolved from small villages into thriving towns and cities, housing over 500,000 Israeli citizens. This strategic positioning was mirrored in other territories captured in 1967: the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt under the 1979 peace accords; the strategic Golan Heights were effectively annexed in 1981; and the Gaza Strip was entirely vacated in 2005. Judea and Samaria, however, represent a unique combination of absolute military necessity and deep historical identity that cannot be replicated elsewhere.
Beyond defensive strategy, Judea and Samaria represent the cradle of Jewish civilization. Cities and landmarks with uninterrupted historical and religious connections to the Jewish people fill the landscape. This includes Hebron, where the biblical patriarchs and matriarchs are buried; Joseph’s tomb in Shechem; and countless archaeological sites proving a millennial Jewish presence long before the Roman exile. Following the 1967 war, Israelis were naturally drawn back to these areas—some returning to communities like the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem and Hebron, from which they had been violently ethnically cleansed by Arab forces in 1948. For much of the Israeli public, the notion of Jews "occupying" the very hillsides where King David’s monarchy was established illustrates the profound historical absurdity of the international narrative.
This historical and emotional tie stands in sharp contrast to the legal warfare waged against Israel in international forums. Detractors frequently assert that Israel is an illegal occupying power under the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, prominent legal scholars and the Israeli government note that "occupied territories" are, by legal definition, lands captured from a recognized, established sovereign. This was never the case in the West Bank. Prior to 1967, only three nations recognized Jordan's illegal annexation of the territory, and Jordan formally renounced all claims to it in 1988. Because a sovereignty vacuum existed both before and after the war, Israel’s defensive acquisition gives it a superior legal title. Furthermore, the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the forced "transfer" of a population; Israelis move to Judea and Samaria completely voluntarily out of ideological conviction, historical connection, or economic choice.
The primary driver of the controversy remains the presence of over two million Palestinian residents who claim the identical territory for a future sovereign state. For years, center-left Israeli factions feared that maintaining a permanent presence among this population might jeopardize Israel's democratic and demographic balance. However, the catastrophic failure of the 2005 Gaza disengagement permanently altered the calculus of the "average" Israeli voter. Sharon’s government evicted 8,000 Jewish residents and demolished their homes to give Palestinians an unprecedented opportunity for self-governance. The experiment resulted in a heavily fortified underground terror base and the horrors of October 7. The fear of creating a second, strategically superior Gaza perched on the mountains directly overlooking Ben Gurion Airport and Tel Aviv is no longer a hypothetical warning—it is an immediate, operational reality.
This strategic consensus was even acknowledged by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter during a historic visit to the Etzion Bloc. Despite his long record of criticizing Israeli policy, Carter remarked, "This particular settlement area is not one that I can envision ever being abandoned or changed over into Palestinian territory. This is part of settlements close to the 1967 line that I think will be here forever." Today, that logic extends far deeper into the ridge of Judea and Samaria. In the absolute absence of a reliable, de-radicalized peace partner, the Israeli electorate widely recognizes that uprooting these communities would severely compromise national security and invite a catastrophic invasion into the center of the country.
As the political parties mobilize for the October 2026 elections, the consensus surrounding Judea and Samaria has hardened around a proud, security-first position. Right-wing and nationalist coalitions are campaigning on deepening infrastructure investments, expanding municipal boundaries, and legally cementing Israel's hold on these vital territories. Even centrist opposition factions have largely abandoned the rhetoric of sweeping evacuations. The defining electoral question of 2026 is no longer whether Israel should retain Judea and Samaria, but how to optimize this strategic depth to permanently deter regional adversaries, ensuring the safety of the Jewish state from its ancient heartland to its modern coastline.




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